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ABSTRACT: 
 
PATRICK ISAAC DICK: HIGH LINKAGE, LOW LEVERAGE AND THE THREE 
COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: 
EXPLAINING REGIME DURABILITY 
(Under the direction of Milada Anna Vachudova, Ph.D.) 
 
Bosnia has three main political parties.  Their perennial electoral success ensures 
that Bosnian politics are dominated by ethno-nationalist interests, which are 
antithetical to the liberal democratic Bosnia to which the European Union hopes 
to give membership someday. Bosnians are also unhappy. Yet there has been little 
party turnover since the end of the war in 1995. This thesis explores the reasons 
behind the electoral success of the SDA, HDZ and SNSD.  I find that Bosnia´s 
institutional arrangement has created three distinct political blocs, each run by a 
single party regime. Each regime follows somewhat predictable patterns of 
illiberal competition and power maintenance. Consequently, the three-bloc 
political arrangement severely reduces the leverage of Western actors like the EU 
pushing for liberalization in the country.  This indicates that a more effective 
approach might be to engage each of the bloc-regimes individually in order to 
liberalize the whole country in the long run. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 Each year the National Democratic Institute conducts a public opinion survey in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, Bosnia) with the principal objective of determining 
popular sentiments toward the country´s economic, political and democratic development. 
Bosnians are unimpressed with the current state of affairs, to put it lightly (Public 
Opinion Poll Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010). The only change in recent years is the rise 
in percentage of people who think the country is headed in the wrong direction.1 
 The political class is doing little to alleviate the pressure and pessimism felt by 
Bosnians. Since the end of the bloody and costly civil war in 1995, Serb, Bosniak and 
Croat ethno-nationalists have reliably dragged their feet in passing and implementing 
important reforms—or blocked them outright.  Often they have been necessary measures 
for future entry into the European Union (EU), a prospect which is generally very 
popular. The political and economic liberalization of post-communist and post-conflict 
countries have proven to be difficult processes, but given the EU's successful record in 
promoting democratization in post-communist countries Bosnia´s lack of progress is 
surprising. What progress that has been made has often depended on considerable 
pressure by (and the executive authority of) the U.N. Office of the High Representative 
(OHR), the office charged with overseeing the implementation of the 1995 peace 
agreement. More recently, despite the popularity of EU accession, Serb and Croat 
nationalists from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the Croat 
Democratic Union (HDZ), respectively, have continued to block constitutional reforms 
                                         
1 Public Opinion Poll Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008, 2009. National Democratic Institute. 
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required by Brussels, demanding more autonomy before the process can move forward 
(Toal and Maksić 2011). As it stands Bosnia is already one of the most decentralized and 
institutionally fragmented states in the world, and these demands are antithetical to the 
centralization considered necessary to move forward toward EU membership. Of the 
three “constituent peoples”, only Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) elites can be counted on for 
support for liberalizing agendas, though their support is tenuous and largely based on the 
fact that they would benefit from a centralized Bosnia due to their demographic 
advantage. Nevertheless, it would be an overstatement to say that the Party for 
Democratic Action (SDA) or Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) have been fully 
cooperative in the reform process—a fact that became all too clear during the 2006 April 
Package failure (Bieber 2010). 
 Why are these parties winning?  Has EU leverage faded over time, or are their 
domestic factors that make Bosnia an anomaly? At the very least, with Bosnia´s 
dismal economic record, high-profile corruption and widespread dissatisfaction we 
can reasonably expect high levels of turnover at election time as voters punish poor, 
corrupt performance (Pop-Eleches 2010). International election monitors report that 
polling takes place with very little fraud, meaning that the SNSD, HDZ and SDA are 
winning free elections.  What accounts for the dominance of wartime nationalist 
parties since the civil war? And, finally, what opportunities exist for EU conditionality 
to effect political change? 
 With the other former Yugoslav republics progressively lining up for accession 
to the EU, Bosnia threatens to be a hole in the EU map and a source of regional 
instability.  During the past two decades, EU foreign policy has been remarkably 
successful securing stability in the region.  EU enlargement has capitalized on its 
leverage in the neighborhood, and played an important role in securing liberal 
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democratic and stable outcomes as Central and Eastern Europe transitioned from 
Communism (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Vachudova 2005; Whitman and 
Juncos 2009). In view of its security interests, the EU has sought to reduce its 
exposure to dysfunctional, neighbors who would pose acute security risks to an 
economic and political bloc of free trade and movement. Failing to secure a stable 
Bosnia would undoubtedly be damaging to Europe´s position as a normative power 
and state-builder in the long run. 
 In this thesis I am interested in two questions: how Bosnia´s incumbents have 
maintained power and why the EU has not been able to do anything about it.  In other 
words, why don't Bosnian voters “throw the bums out” (Pop-Eleches 2010)? 
Ultimately, I demonstrate that Bosnia is not governed by a fully democratic regime 
despite the free elections, but an authoritarian one in which competition is distorted. I 
argue that, like in other authoritarian regimes, the ability of oppositions and 
alternative parties to compete is highly constrained, making electoral success less a 
product of appeal than a lack of credible options. This means that there is indeed 
space for change, but it is limited and must be exploited differently. To show this I do 
not focus on unsuccessful oppositions but utilize the decidedly incumbent-centered 
approach of Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky (2010). With this approach I can also 
demonstrate that Bosnia has effectively been carved into three distinct “competitive 
authoritarian” regimes in which the incumbents have highly unequal access to 
political resources and do not compete against each other. Instead, they buttress their 
counterparts´ positions as ethnic defenders. As a result, the ability of the EU to effect 
change is much more limited than it has been elsewhere because it must influence the 
development of three regimes with separate goals at once. Therefore, in spite of high 
levels of linkage with Western actors, this institutional arrangement considerably 
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reduces EU leverage. The strong organizational capacity of the the SDA, SNSD and 
HDZ further reinforce this dynamic. In the end, Bosnian voters are left with few 
choices but an ethnic one, for which only one Croat, Bosniak and Serb party at a time 
can claim legitimacy. 
 The fact that Bosnia´s major ethno-nationalist parties do not compete against 
each other is perhaps no surprise to observers (see: Bochsler 2006; Caspersen 2006; 
Hulsey 2010; Manning 2004). That its political dynamics can actually be explained 
quite clearly by an existing theory on democratization, however, is not. The country´s 
complicated institutional arrangement, post-conflict legacy and demographic 
dynamics often make it an outlying case in many respects, whether discussing 
transition from Communism, ethnic conflict or international intervention. I argue that 
this is not necessary. 
 The purpose of this paper is to generally understand the electoral endurance of 
Bosnia´s entrenched ethno-nationalist parties despite high levels of disaffection and 
EU engagement. This is important for two reasons. First, I hope to better understand 
under what circumstances voters’ preferences will not be reflected in electoral 
outcomes, especially considering such high levels of disaffection. That the hegemony 
of wartime nationalists has been linked to poorer local governance as well as state-
level intransigence makes this question even more urgent (Hulsey 2010). Second, the 
tenure of the SDA, SNSD and HDZ is certainly not in the interests of the EU. They 
have persistently blocked efforts at reform to a state that remains undeniably 
dysfunctional and very dependent on international aid almost two decades after the 
end of the conflict there. In fact, several scholars have clearly demonstrated the 
incentives for the ruling elites that run these parties to maintain the current 
arrangements (see especially: Andreas 2004; Divjak and Pugh 2008; Donais 2003; 
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Pugh 2004). Failure to effect change threatens the EU's role as a normative power, 
and in order to develop more effective Europeanization policies—EU policies that 
affect domestic politics (Sedelmeier 2011)—it is important to understand what in the 
country is weakening EU leverage. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. The following section introduces competitive 
authoritarianism as a regime type and includes a discussion of power maintenance in 
illiberal contexts. The third section discusses Bosnia's domestic political dynamics, 
with special attention paid to its principal actors: the wartime nationalist parties. I then 
defend my categorization of the country as competitive authoritarian. The 
international dimension of Bosnia's political development is the focus of the fourth 
section. It includes a discussion on the development of the EU as a foreign policy 
actor, and, drawing on the theoretical frameworks of Levitsky and Way (2010) and the 
Europeanization literature, I demonstrate how EU leverage in Bosnia has been 
limited. The following section briefly discusses prospects for the EU to have a 
liberalizing influence in the country. The final section concludes. 
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II. Resource Asymmetries: Maintaining Power in Illiberal Regimes 
  
 There is a domestic and an international aspect to the theory of competitive 
authoritarianism, both of which are important to this study. The domestic aspect 
incorporates many important theories on political dynamics in illiberal regimes, and I 
begin with it here because it is critical for understanding the means by which the 
SNSD, SDA and HDZ have come to dominate politics within Bosnia. 
 Until now I have mentioned the importance of the access to resources to 
acquiring and maintaining political control. While resources in general are necessary 
to compete in any election, in illiberal regimes access to them is limited to a small 
number of actors and they are used to further restrict the competitiveness of 
oppositions as well as to appeal to voters. 
  The theory follows that due to the high degree of legitimacy enjoyed by 
democratic institutions, political leaders nearly everywhere routinely seek to 
legitimize their tenure using democratic practices. Concerns for both domestic and 
international legitimacy make tampering with elections or their results costly. As a 
result, regular elections, even highly transparent ones, and multi-party systems are 
tolerated by autocratic leaderships. This, of course, means for such a regime that it 
cannot be purely authoritarian, like super-authoritarian Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan 
(Hale 2010; Howard 2006). The regular, if unequal, freedom of movement and 
opinion will necessarily provide avenues for oppositions and challengers, even if they 
are limited and narrow.  
  Meanwhile, the very same regime will certainly continue to face the same 
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incentives to control these avenues as traditional authoritarians. The access to 
resources, privilege, influence and—quite simply—power continues to motivate 
incumbents to reduce the uncertainty of electoral outcomes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007). Common methods of control include monitoring of broadcast media, 
intimidation of journalists and activists or high representation thresholds for parties in 
legislatures. Though qualitatively very distinct, each method effectively distorts the 
playing field by reducing the willingness or ability of oppositions to compete. Other 
less coercive practices like the selective delivery of political goods, services and 
resources creates political and often personal linkages between voters, interests and 
political elites. The political goods, which range from pensions to contracts and tax 
exemptions to legal immunity, are offered in exchange for political support, financing 
or votes. The linkages that result lead to political association and loyalty (Nichter 
2008; Scott 1969; Stokes 2005). Russia provides a good example in many ways. The 
country has a very high level of Internet usership, and the protests this past winter 
have demonstrated a sophisticated ability to mobilize. On the other hand, civil society 
groups continue to be co-opted through corporatist mechanisms or harassed, while 
potential presidential candidates face strict and often arbitrary requirements for 
presenting their candidacy. This is to say nothing of ballot fraud (Hale 2010a; Way 
2005). Nevertheless, whoever wins the elections wins the presidency and access to 
many levers of control. Access to resources for rent-seeking, coercion and patronage 
become both opportunities afforded to winners and the very mechanism for 
maintaining their tenure. Overall, the effect is that the electoral playing field is 
distorted and made uneven between elections, reducing the need to undermine the 
elections themselves directly (Levitsky and Way 2010). 
  A crucial if easily overlooked characteristic is that regimes such as this will 
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not have complete control over these levers. This is because with even limited 
democratic and transparent accountability mechanisms an executive must rely on 
support of elites in important positions. The top media tycoon, military officials or 
members of an election commission are common examples. Political parties are one 
way of monitoring and controlling elite supporters, as is the case in Bosnia (Levitsky 
and Way 2010; Andreas 2004; Way 2005). Furthermore, domestic and international 
legitimacy both rely on a least a modicum of rights' protections and fairness on 
election day, particularly in cases like Bosnia where a large number of election 
monitors are present. Thus, the regime is competitive in two ways. First, to win 
sufficient support the regime's leadership can distribute resources, positions and 
privileges in ways that ensure allies in the right places, or at least the minimal 
cooperation of the right people. Access to these opportunities can be won in elections 
or the election of allies. Clearly candidates have real incentives to compete 
meaningfully for votes and office as a way to secure influence and access for 
themselves. 
  Second, since in these regimes elections are mostly seen as legitimate 
oppositions use them to gain power and influence at the expense of incumbents. In 
other words, there is always the possibility that oppositions can overcome their 
disadvantages and gain power. The disappointing democratic development in the 
wake of the Color Revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan notwithstanding, 
they are prime examples of this possibility.  This necessarily creates uncertainty of 
outcomes. If such uncertainty grows sufficiently large it can cause elite defection as 
the attempt to “hedge their bets”, so to speak, against hanging onto the coattails of 
incumbents who are losing power and influence to some opposition by whom they 
could be later punished. This is one of the most important developments in periods of 
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competitive authoritarian turnover. Henry Hale (2005) describes the process as 
cyclical, in which regimes consolidate power and lose it as support becomes 
increasingly unreliable and patronage becomes unsustainable. As a result, incumbents 
will try to reduce the uncertainty by competing, whether by campaigning or making 
sure the playing field is uneven in the interim. 
  Incumbents in such regimes undoubtedly have better access to and politically 
important resources, such as control over regulation, coercion and sources of state 
financing. The resources at their disposal can be used to garner favor among 
electorates. The promise of regional or sectoral privileges and the continued 
distribution of benefits create an interest in the outcome for voters, giving candidates 
and incentive to campaign and create voter-candidate linkages (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004; Kitschelt 2007; Scott 1969). In short, Levitsky and Way (2010) describe 
competitive authoritarian regimes as 
 “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely 
viewed as the primary means of gaining power, in which incumbents' abuse of the 
state places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents. Such regimes 
are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest 
seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily 
skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but not fair” (22). 
 
In my analysis I discuss how Bosnia's elites have effectively limited electoral choices 
by dividing the country and controlling its resources. Why has the EU and its partners 
not been able to alter this, either by pressuring parties to moderate or providing 
incentives to cooperate? One of the principal objectives of Levitsky and Way's (201) 
study is to determine regime trajectory patterns in this group of countries since the 
end of the Cold War. They consolidate their theory to test three factors: linkage with 
the West; strength of incumbent organization, whether the state or party, and; leverage 
of the West. The different combinations of presence and strength of these factors 
produce predictable patterns of regime trajectory toward democracy, full 
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authoritarianism or partial, competitive authoritarianism. As we will see, the 
combination in Bosnia, a case of high linkage with but low leverage of Western actors 
and institutions, creates a kind of constant but low-intensity pressure to reform. The 
ability to maintain these resource asymmetries in the face of international pressure, 
and therefore ability to limit real competition, has depended on precisely this perhaps 
counter intuitively low level of leverage. 
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III. Wartime Nationalist Regimes in Bosnia 
 
 In this section, I introduce the SDA, SNSD and the HDZ as the principal 
domestic actors in Bosnia. I begin with a brief introduction to their poor governance 
record and explore several explanations of their support in spite of it. Ultimately I 
argue that an institutional approach focused on incumbents themselves will be the 
most fruitful. I then defend the categorization of Bosnia as competitive authoritarian, 
in which nationalist elites have carved out three distinct ethnic blocs. Competition 
within those blocs is real but unfair, and institutional arrangements encourage 
competition between them for state resources on an ethnic basis. 
 I have made several references to the poor governing record of the major 
nationalist parties, who have effectively been in power in one combination or another 
since the end of the war. Current conditions within the state are largely a product of 
this record. Several steps of the policy-making and implementation process urgently 
need reform: poor oversight has allowed millions of dollars to leak out of Bosnian 
public coffers to unsustainable public spending programs, financially unviable public 
firms and patronage schemes (Andreas 2004; UNHCR 2010; Divjak and Pugh 2008); 
rent-seeking opportunities are plentiful; public offices and tasks are regularly 
duplicated, both because of ethnic quotas and patronage networks (NDI Assessment 
Report 2010; World Bank 2009). The multiple, unstandardized layers of 
governance—which vary between the highly autonomous entities, the Republika 
Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Federation”)—make 
policy implementation fragmented at best, and completely unaccountable at worst 
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(World Bank 2009). The same is true for public financing, with the two entities and 
ten cantons within the federation all having different financing policies (World Bank 
2007, 2009). 
 Probably most problematic, however, are the treacherously plentiful veto 
points along the way, the most famous of which is the “vital national interest” veto. 
This veto allows representatives of one of the “constituent peoples” (Serbs, Croats 
and Bosniaks) to veto laws almost unilaterally at the state level and in the courts 
(Bahtić-Kunrath 2011; NDI Assessment Report 2010; on veto points see: Immurgut 
1992). The willingness to take advantage of numerous veto points has allowed ethno-
nationalist incumbents to strangle the policy-making process, and reform to the 
process itself has been, quite predictably, the first victim. Given elites´ preference for 
the status quo (see: Bahtić-Kunrath 2011; Pugh 2002, 2004), the only plausible short-
term solution to this stalemate is electoral turnover. Yet the 2008 local and 2010 
general elections seem only to have cemented the SDA, HDZ and SNSD in their 
positions of power, the one exception coming from the victory of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) for the race of the Croat seat of the three-man presidency. 
Over a year followed, however, before a government was formed at the state level. 
 Thus, in spite of the inability to make important reforms, poor service 
delivery, high levels of corruption and almost forty percent official unemployment, 
the wartime ethno-nationalist parties have continued to win. It is instructive to explore 
some alternative explanations for why this is. The first, and perhaps most popular, 
concludes that Bosnian voters simply continue to be very nationalist. While this is 
likely the case for a considerable part of the population, it still does not explain their 
preference for the SDA, SNSD and HDZ over other less successful nationalist parties, 
nor why they would continue to vote for parties, whom they hardly trust as it is (NDI 
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Assessment Report 2010; World Bank 2005), well known for being corrupt (see: Pop-
Eleches 2010). Relatedly, another explanation holds that Bosnians are unhappy with 
the current political arrangement in the country and this is expressed by voting for 
nationalists, each of whom pushes a different vision of a more or less centralized state 
(Toal and Maksic 2011). Again, this essentially only explains choice for ethnicity, not 
the marked preference for the incumbents—whose political record is terrible—over 
parties with similar goals. 
 A third hypothesis expects that these parties are offering important and 
popular programmatic alternatives, essentially following the logic of liberal 
democratic party competition. A quick glance at the NDI public opinion polls reveal 
that voter preferences are hardly aligned with those of elite parties with respect to 
economic issues or governance.  Nevertheless, this hypothesis was worth testing. To 
do so I tested some demographic and socio-economic factors often related to 
programmatic preferences, such as urban and rural cleavages and socio-economic 
status for which data was available, against electoral success. These cleavages were 
very poorly related to the electoral success of any of the major nationalist parties. In 
short, the results indicated that other explanations needed to be explored.2 
 In this thesis I explore the hypothesis that there are institutional factors that 
both distort competition and provide incentives to compete for resources on an ethnic 
basis. Quotas for ethnic representation cause horizontal competition for resources on 
                                         
2 Using the proportion of seats won in municipal governments by party as the dependent 
variables, I tested a variety of socio-economic and demographic factors for their effect on electoral 
success using multiple linear regressions. The Independent variables were: population, voter turnout, 
location on IEBL, GDP per capita, a dummy variable for the winner's incumbency and a dummy 
variable for each canton (the RS being counted as a single canton because of its more centralized 
structure). There were no statistically significant results, and the relationships were quite limited to 
begin with. Dataset is compiled by the author, using data from the Bosnian state Ministry of Elections 
and the state Ministry of Statistics.  Data can be found at 
http://www.izbori.ba/Mandati27102008/index.asp.  Demographic data can be found at 
http://mojemjesto.ba/en. 
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an ethnic basis at many levels of government, which favors wartime nationalists 
(Hulsey 2010). This effectively limits the ability to compete of smaller nationalist 
parties as well as non-ethnic parties who provide real programmatic governance 
alternatives. Unequal access to resources ensures this arrangement. I have discussed 
how resource disparities distort political competition in illiberal regimes. It is now 
important to take a look at the major actors participating in Bosnia's political field. 
 
Wartime Ethno-Nationalist Parties 
 The designation as “wartime nationalist parties” (Manning 2004) indeed 
comes from the fact that as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, the nationalist SDA, 
SDS and HDZ hastened the onset of the war, in which they consolidated their 
organizational strength between 1992 and 1995. During this time they acted as the 
most important organizational apparatuses of the three-sided war as well as the 
principal actors in peace negotiations. The exception of course is the SNSD, though it 
is important to remember that they have navigated, inherited and dominated the 
political space built by the SDS. 
 This wartime position gave these three forces several distinct advantages in 
political resources. First, as actors during the war they effectively had a monopoly on 
ethnic security political capital coming out of it (Manning 2007). This means that they 
have always had the most legitimate claim as the defenders of their respective 
ethnicity, giving them an edge over other nationalists. Second, their organizational 
strength benefited from being forged in conflict—a common characteristic in post-
conflict societies (Hulsey 2010; Manning 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010). Third, they 
began the post-Dayton era as incumbents; they enjoyed more media coverage, access 
to state resources and the opportunity to oversee the post-communist privatization 
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process, a lucrative position in many post-communist countries (Birch 1997; Manning 
2007; McFaul 2005; Moller and Skaaning 2010). Finally, during the war strong 
connections were developed with both industry and elite criminal organizations, who 
provided arms and the delivery of goods in wartime. This allowed the parties to 
secure access to extralegal resources denied to other parties after the conflict (Andreas 
2004). 
 In the beginning, two outcomes were possible under these circumstances. 
Renewed conflict was one. This was the principal concern when crafting the General 
Framework Agreement (“Dayton Peace Agreement”, or DPA) in 1995. The result is 
highly decentralized, consociational state institutions meant to minimize political 
competition between ethnic groups. Implementation of the provisions of the DPA 
would be overseen by the OHR, who would wield executive authority to enact 
legislation and punish officials who actively blocked the process. The peace plan thus 
prevented this first outcome by blunting the effect of group antagonism, but they 
ensured the second possibility: the dominance of wartime incumbents as a result of 
their resource advantages and strong organization (Manning 2007). This outcome was 
cemented with the international community's decision, under considerable pressure by 
the United States, to carry out elections in 1996, so soon after the end of the conflict 
and before opposition groups could organize resources behind their platforms 
(Manning 2004). 
 Since 1995 the wartime nationalist parties have capitalized on their 
advantages: hostile rhetoric and scare tactics without the real threat of war; visibility; 
control over important media outlets; control of the privatization process and access to 
other sources of patronage, and; control over veto points and other channels of 
strangling the reform process. The time spent in all levels of government has given 
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them much more exposure than other parties. Control over the media ensures 
favorable coverage within their respective ethnic constituencies (Divjak and Pugh 
2008; UNHCR 2010). Because of their control over political institutions, wartime 
nationalists have been able to finance costly political campaigns with state- and party-
owned firms, and develop patronage networks to secure the cooperation of public 
officials and community leaders with impunity. Consequently, incumbent nationalist 
elites have been unwilling to make reforms that threaten these arrangements, from 
which corrupt elites have benefited so much.  
 It is not enough, however, to know that the wartime nationalists have benefited 
in terms of resources by their positions of power since 1995. Their access is not only 
an incentive to acquire and maintain control of state institutions but also the means by 
which incumbents maintain power in illiberal regimes. I have discussed how they can 
be deployed in a variety of ways, ranging from more or less coercive. A number of 
power maintenance strategies in illiberal regimes have been identified, some being 
more or less cost effective, depending on the level of accountability and consolidation 
in different regimes. As I argue that Bosnia falls in the range of competitive 
authoritarian regimes, I now show that electoral accountability is more or less present 
but institutional and legal oversight are often limited. 
 
Bosnia, authoritarian? 
  On the surface, Bosnia does not seem to fit the competitive authoritarian mold. 
In spite of the theoretical preoccupation with a more appropriate categorization for 
regimes that are neither purely authoritarian nor democratic, Bosnia still seems to be 
an exception. In fact, Levitsky and Way (2010) do not even include it in their study. 
There are a few reasons for this. First, the unusually wide range of executive power 
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held by the international community in the OHR (known as the “Bonn Powers”) both 
limits the executive power of local political elites and indicates that the state itself still 
does not function without assistance. It is therefore questionable as to whether Bosnia 
and Herzegovina can fully be considered a sovereign state in the classical sense (see: 
Zaum 2003). 
  Second, Bosnian electoral politics are not dominated by one faction, but three. 
They are often mutually antagonistic and compete horizontally for state resources, as 
opposed to the coalitions of factions that often support other competitive authoritarian 
regimes. The executive is weak and very limited. Such antagonism is almost more 
reminiscent of pluralism than elite coordination and cooperation. 
  Third, the elections are quite free, with very few incidences of ballot stuffing 
or voter fraud (OSCE). Finally, party turnover has not been completely absent, as we 
can see in the ascension of the SNSD over the SDS in the RS and the recent success 
of the SDP.  
  That Bosnia was not included in Levitsky and Way's study is itself no reason 
to conclude that the country's political dynamics do not fit the model. As a result of its 
extraordinarily complicated consociational constitution and post-conflict legacy, 
researchers tend to exclude Bosnia from cross-country empirical studies quite 
regularly. The lack of a census and uniformity of practices and institutions across 
administrative units also tend to render the use of data in the country problematic. 
  Upon a second look, however, it becomes quite clear that the electoral 
dynamics in Bosnia fall quite neatly into the regime type. Despite the high level of 
international involvement in the country's administration, elites still compete for 
control of the state's many administrative institutions. The highly decentralized 
administrative system means that local officials are ultimately responsible for policy 
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and its implementation. While in the RS administration is considerably more 
centralized at the entity level, the municipalities are still highly instrumental in the 
implementation of policy, raising taxes and the provision of services. In the 
Federation, each canton determines the structure of service delivery mechanism and 
most of the revenue policies (“Local Governance and Service Delivery in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” 2009). The municipalities, again, are instrumental in policy 
implementation where they are not already so in the formation of the local policy. 
Like in other cases where machine politics in particular have developed, the general 
electoral advantage enjoyed by incumbents, rent-seeking opportunities, the power to 
award government contracts and the chance to take advantage of other discretionary 
or corrupt practices all provide elites at all levels and incentive to compete 
meaningfully for official positions, legitimately or not (Divjak and Pugh 2008; also 
see: Della Porta and Vannucci 2006; Kitschelt 2007; Nichter 2008; Scott 1969). 
  In large part thanks to the international community, electoral competition for 
those positions is also highly regulated and largely takes place without fraud (OSCE 
2010). Among the various  missions with monitoring, advisory and at time executive 
mandates in Bosnia, such as the OHR and the EU Police Mission (EUPM), election 
monitors—the most important of which being the OSCE—have both ensured and 
reported minimum tampering at the polls and places of registration (OSCE 2008, 
2010). Given the lack of consolidation of the state's administrative institutions in 
general, it is not necessarily clear that this would be the case without the presence of 
the international community. Nonetheless, a relatively undistorted mechanism for 
realizing electoral competition, i.e. free elections, Bosnia does have, fulfilling one of 
the principal requirements for the competitive authoritarian regime type: an avenue 
for competition. What makes it authoritarian is the level of fairness. 
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  Quite simply, the elections are free but not fair (Caspersen 2006; Hulsey 2010; 
OSCE 2010). Scholars, analysts and international officials alike attest to the 
opaqueness of the world of Bosnia's elites. Political parties, state- and party-owned 
firms and media outlets regularly fail to fulfill adequate auditing requirements (World 
Bank 2007; Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission Report 2007). 
Unfinished economic privatization since the collapse of Yugoslav communism 
continues to blur the lines between public and private (Andreas 2004; Divjak and 
Pugh 2008; Donais 2002).  As of 2008, a large number of firms still needed to be 
privatized—490 in the Federation and over a thousand in the RS—giving pubic 
officials large control over economic resources. Mostar Aluminum or the Gačko 
thermoelectric power plant, for example, are large firms that provide important 
services and act as political cashcows for the HDZ and the SNSD respectively, having 
strong ties to their leadership (Divjak and Pugh 2008: 377; “New Corruption Charges 
Against Former Croatian Prime Minister” 24 January 2012). 
  As previously discussed, the history of the SDS, SDA and HDZ as war and 
political entrepreneurs has ensured the survival of elite connections to the illegal 
shadow economy and organized crime (Andreas 2004; Divjak and Pugh 2008; Donais 
2003; Manning 2007; Pugh 2004). Such connections provided incumbents with access 
to the large illicit economy and its extralegal resources, including methods of coercion 
not available for outsiders. Several reports point to the involvement of organized 
crime in cases of harassment of political opposition groups (Business Week 2009; 
Donais 2003; UNHCR 2010). Despite Bosnia's “advanced legal regime” protecting 
the freedom of expression and prohibiting libel, “ethnic divisions are [still] reflected 
in the public broadcasting structure (OSCE 2007: 1; also see: NDI Assessment Report 
2010). Violent coercion and legal harassment for political ends are not uncommon 
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still, particularly with respect to journalists leading up to elections (UNHCR 2010). 
According to the OSCE report on the State of Media Freedom in the country, media 
outlets in the RS have increasingly shown signs of politically motivated self-
censorship. In early 2007, the RS government “boycotted” the state-level public 
broadcaster, BHT1, after it published critical reports on RS public officials by 
blocking reporters' entrance to a public meeting, eventually prompting the OSCE 
report. Whistle-blowing organizations can also be targeted. In 2008, Transparency 
International closed its office in Banja Luka for fear of harassment because of their 
involvement in reporting on corrupt networks that led to Milorad Dodik, president of 
the Republika Srpska (Business Week: 17 March 2009).  
  Furthermore, while enjoying a modicum of freedom and independence, the 
major broadcast media outlets are still tightly tied to state and local control and 
subject to pressure by political elites. Leading up to the closing of the Banja Luka 
office, Transparency International became the subject of criticism in the government-
controlled media, who accused the organization of libel and politically motivated 
reporting (Business Week 2009). According to the 2010 UNHCR report, Bosnia's 142 
broadcast media outlets far exceed the country's market capacity, suggesting that, 
considering the highly ethno-centric nature of most of the local coverage, the outlets 
operate on extralegal funding from political party apparatuses, both in the RS and the 
Federation (OSCE 2007; UNHCR 2010). 
  Though not necessarily affecting directly the ability to compete of other 
parties, the capacity to coerce specific individuals and control the diffusion of 
information among the electorate are undeniably enormous advantages, and highly 
distort the slope of the so-called “playing field”. Following the model, the very 
opportunities to create such distortions are one of the many very important incentives 
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for competing for control of official institutions. 
  There remains one aspect unique to Bosnia, which makes it at least 
superficially distinct from other competitive authoritarian regimes. Even given the 
clear advantages enjoyed by incumbents, at any given time there are still three or four 
major parties who win seats at nearly all levels of government, in both local and 
general elections. This, I argue, has very little to do with programmatic pluralism, as 
state-builders would hope. The Hooghe and Marks's political party index places 
parties on an ideological field with two axes, cultural-political and economic-political. 
The economic-political dimension measures parties' placement on the classic left-right 
economic continuum, while the cultural-political dimension measures characteristics 
previously assumed to be subsumed by economic ideological preferences. The 
continuum runs between Green/Alternative/Libertarian (“Gal”) values to 
Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (“Tan”) ones (Hooghe and Marks 2005). With 
the exception of the SDP, the major parties all fall within the same region of the field. 
The can do this because they do not compete against each other. 
  That the most important secondary parties are the products not of 
programmatic or ideological competition but intra-elite rivalries is too made clear by 
the fact that their ideological profiles closely mirror their co-ethnic rivals (Figure 4.1). 
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey data on the ideological positioning of political parties, 
used to create Hooghe and Marks's index, is instructive here. The only party 
representing a real threat to the status quo is the only party presenting a real 
programmatic and identity alternative.  
[FIGURE 4.1 HERE] 
  The gap in cultural-political scores between the SDS and SNSD has almost 
certainly closed since this survey was taken in 2007. Increased calls by Milorad Dodik 
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for a referendum on RS independence can be seen as evidence of this. The ethnified 
electoral system in the RS provides incentives for “ethnic-outbidding”, especially 
once in power (and resources from Western actors, who originally favored Dodik, are 
no longer necessary to compete against a strong incumbent) (Caspersen 2006; Toal 
and Maskić 2011). The SDP, on the other hand, actually occupies a political space 
very different from the others, similar to many moderate Social Democratic parties 
across Europe. They thereby present a real ideological alternative to voters. Despite 
their growing popularity across Bosnia, however, their success is largely confined to 
the Bosniak bloc. The results of this multiple linear regression show that success by 
either the SNSD or the HDZ has a clear negative relationship with success of the SDP 
(Table 4.1). That its relationship with the SDA is positive indicates that its success is 
tied and limited to the same political space as the SDA, though the strength of the 
relationship is limited by the zero-sum nature of elections. 
[TABLE 4.1 HERE] 
 Nonetheless, in spite of its recent success, when compared to the other blocs 
the SDP appears to be nothing more than an opposition party, and the outcomes seem 
to close reflect the electoral dynamics. Their success has been limited compared to the 
Tan parties, even given its programmatic alternatives (Figure 4.2). 
[FIGURE 4.2 HERE] 
 Other than the SDP, the system is dominated by a single party type with the 
majority of the economic-political variation coming between blocs than within them. 
It is worth questioning whether the SDP would adopt Bosniak nationalism were it to 
come to power. Even assuming it would behave illiberally, it seems unlikely given 
that there are other ways to take advantage of Left-Tan political space (such as anti-
capitalist populism, given their history as a reformed Communist party). Nonetheless 
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it is something worth watching for. At the moment, they present the only real 
programmatic alternative among the major parties. Apart from the SDP, the only 
choice is between ethnic interests. Data from the 2008 local elections reinforces the 
fact that this is effectively no choice at all (Table 4.2). 
[TABLE 4.2 HERE) 
 Like the example of the SDP above, the results of these multiple linear 
regressions demonstrate the near mutual exclusion of the success of each party with 
respect to the others at the local level. The success of each party has nearly a directly 
inverse relationship with the success of others, and the results are highly significant 
being at the 0.01 confidence level. 
 To clarify, any party can present a candidate anywhere in the country. At the 
state and, in the Federation, entity level, any party can present a candidate for the 
ethnically defined positions, determined by equal representation quotas for each of the 
constituent peoples. At the municipal level, public officials are not elected on any 
basis of ethnic quotas, though positions in public administration are allocated in this 
way, at least in principal. This means that the parties can, at the local level, compete 
against each other anywhere in the country. This is not happening. The three most 
powerful political organizations in the country are not then trying to steal votes from 
each other. This is not competition. This is demarcation. 
 This reflects the effects of the ethnic cleansing that took place in the war. 
Many municipalities that ended the war with a mixed ethnic population were 
considered on the “front lines” and were split by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line 
(IEBL) and made into two new ones (Hulsey 2010), de facto defining the local 
administrative units ethnically. Therefore, there is not even real ethnic pluralism in the 
electoral arena; however, since there are multiple parties represented in state 
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institutions at various levels there is real incentive to compete for state resources. This 
arrangement complicates the analysis of political space in the country considerably 
because at the state level a kind of trench-warfare political stagnation is the most 
visible result.  
 But competition happens at several levels. At the top, ethnic interests compete 
horizontally for state and, in the Federation, entity and canton resources. Meanwhile, 
within blocs, both ethnically defined and nominally non-ethnic parties compete 
vertically for preeminence there. Though they are effectively limited to their ethnic 
bloc they do compete in a meaningful way. In the RS, the SNSD has overtaken the 
SDS, and likely for the foreseeable future. Among Bosniaks, the SDP has begun to 
tentatively threaten the hegemony of the SDA.  
 So why has the EU been incapable of encouraging more liberalization? After 
all, even the SDP is mostly known for its multi-ethnic, anti-nationalist stance, and the 
differences between the politico-economic positions of the major parties are quite 
narrow. Below I discuss how the fact that vertical competition is limited to blocs 
substantially limits the ability of the EU to liberalize outcomes (on “liberalizing 
electoral outcomes”, see: Howard 2006). 
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Figures 
Figure 4.1: 1 = 
SDA; 2 = S BiH; 3 = SDP; 4 = HDZ (BiH); 5 = HDZ 1990; 6 = 
SNSD; 7 = SDS. Data from the Chapel Hill Dataset on Party 
Positioning (http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php)  
Figure 4.2 . Mean proportion of seats won in local governments in 
2008 municipal elections. Dataset is compiled by the author, using 
data from the Bosnian state Ministry of Elections and the state 
Ministry of Statistics.  Data can be found at 
http://www.izbori.ba/Mandati27102008/index.asp.  Demographic 
data can be found at http://mojemjesto.ba/en. 
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Tables 
SDP Coefficients:  
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  0.12513    0.02890   4.330 2.85e-05 ***  
sda.prop     0.17094    0.07363   2.322 0.021724 *   
hdz.prop    -0.24956    0.06934  -3.599 0.000444 ***  
snsd.prop   -0.23611    0.07675  -3.076 0.002529 **  
Table 4.1. Result of Multiple Linear Regression. The coefficients show the effect of the number of seats 
won in municipal governments by each of the dominant parties on the number of seats won by the SDP. 
Dataset is compiled by the author, using data from the Bosnian state Ministry of Elections and the state 
Ministry of Statistics.  Data can be found at http://www.izbori.ba/Mandati27102008/index.asp.  
Demographic data can be found at http://mojemjesto.ba/en. 
 
SDA Coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  0.32913    0.01813  18.150  < 2e-16 *** 
snsd.prop   -0.74355    0.06197 -11.999  < 2e-16 *** 
hdz.prop    -0.38223    0.07300  -5.236 5.93e-07 *** 
HDZ Coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  0.26271    0.02744   9.574  < 2e-16 *** 
sda.prop    -0.43101    0.08232  -5.236 5.93e-07 *** 
snsd.prop   -0.58165    0.07988  -7.281 2.23e-11 *** 
SNSD Coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  0.32650    0.01590  20.530  < 2e-16 *** 
sda.prop    -0.68430    0.05703 -11.999  < 2e-16 *** 
hdz.prop    -0.47472    0.06519  -7.281 2.23e-11 *** 
Figure 4.2. Results of Multiple Linear Regressions, where "success" (proportion of seats won in local 
governments) of each party is used as the dependent variable, and tested against the success of its 
nationalist counterparts. Dataset is compiled by the author, using data from the Bosnian state Ministry 
of Elections and the state Ministry of Statistics.  Data can be found at 
http://www.izbori.ba/Mandati27102008/index.asp.  Demographic data can be found at 
http://mojemjesto.ba/en. 
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IV. The International Dimension: Competitive Authoritarianism and 
Europeanization 
 
Our External Actor: The European Union 
 While incumbents in any system are unlikely to make changes that threaten 
their position, the EU through its enlargement policy has effectively provided 
incentives for illiberal elites to moderate, either by empowering democratic 
oppositions or providing material incentives to liberalize (Vachudova 2008: for 
discussions on enlargement and Europeanization in general, see: Pop-Eleches 2010; 
Sedelmeier 2011). In fact, conditionality to EU accession, the process by which 
membership is offered to countries on the basis that the EU's aquis communitaire is 
progressively implemented, has perhaps been the most successful democratization 
tool in history (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004). As hinted to above, both countries that 
began liberal and illiberal trajectories have consolidated liberal democratic regimes 
while fulfilling EU requirements (Vachudova 2005). The leverage employed by the 
EU comes from both the general popularity of EU membership, elite desire for 
international prestige and, ultimately, material incentives. Bosnia's extremely 
destructive and bloody civil war certainly makes it a unique case in post-communist 
Europe, but not its low level of democratic development in its first decade after 
communism. Yet is has arguably made the least progress toward a coherent, liberal 
democratic state for whom EU accession is a feasible outcome. 
  This is particularly puzzling for two reasons. First, the presence of the EU in 
Bosnia has been considerable and increasing. The EU Police and rule of law missions 
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sent European experts to monitor and advise. The OHR has effectively been fused 
with the office of the EU Special Representative. The EU is even funding very visible 
construction and renovation projects like the Sarajevo town hall. Movement toward 
the EU is quite popular among polling respondents, thus both contact and popularity 
are present. Its effect, nonetheless, still seems quite limited in comparison to other 
states. The case of Bosnia shows that this effect depends on both linkage and 
leverage, and different doses of each will produce different results. The difference, I 
argue, is that while linkage between the EU and Bosnia is high, EU leverage is 
actually quite low.  
  This is not to say that the Europe is not an important actor there. Quite the 
contrary, it is one of the most important actors. Accession to the EU itself provides 
one of the most important questions in Bosnian politics. Its positions can build 
opportunity structures for actors in the country. The EU's clear preference for Milorad 
Dodik over the SDS was crucial for Dodik's ascendance to power in 2006 (Caspersen 
2006). But as Dodik and the SNSD increasingly took over the ultra-nationalist 
political space in the RS it became clear that its ability to effect change in the short 
run was limited. 
  To understand why this is I turn back to the argument proposed by Levitsky 
and Way (2010). Understanding the international aspect of the theory of competitive 
authoritarianism is critical for explaining the durability of Bosnia's major nationalist 
parties. As a theory it provides a clear framework for understanding electoral 
competition in an illiberal environment, but just as importantly, how that environment 
is affected by international actors.  
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Competitive Authoritarianism, Democratization and the International Dimension 
  Democratization is not necessarily the object of this study. The durability of 
dominant ethno-nationalist parties in Bosnia can nonetheless be considered a 
symptom of indication of the country's democratic trajectory. The political dominance 
by nationalist parties in their respective ethnic communities has fragmented Bosnian 
society and carved out three distinct single-party regimes. As a result, domestic 
liberalizing pressure is correspondingly fragmented electorally and therefore quite 
weak. EU pressure to rationalize administrative institutions and increase transparency 
aims to have the dual effect of improving governance while also opening competition 
to opposition groups by leveling the playing field. The mechanisms behind the EU's 
limited success can be explained in terms of linkage and leverage, while being 
reinforced by findings on Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe. 
  Linkage, Leverage, Organizational Strength and Europeanization. Though the 
two ideas overlap in practice, Levitsky and Way's theoretical distinction between 
leverage and linkage is important. Their definition of leverage is relatively intuitive 
and refers to “governments' vulnerability to external democratizing pressure” (2010: 
71). This may mean dependency on aid, access to markets or the extent to which 
Western actors need their cooperation. The variable is operationalized according to 
factors such as gross domestic product (GDP), abundance of natural resources or 
access to sophisticated weaponry that generally indicate how insulated a country is 
against Western institutional leverage. I illustrated above how such an 
operationalization in fact makes Bosnia a problematic case. While the operationalized 
factors would not make it a case of low leverage, other domestic institutional factors, 
namely those associated with consociationalism and the threat of a failed state in 
Europe, also render leverage less effective. The most important characteristic of 
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leverage is that it is a short-term process, meant to produce specific results, and can 
therefore be mitigated by institutional choke points as easily as by economic or 
military power. 
  Linkage, on the other hand, refers to the agglomerated economic, social and 
political relationships between a country and, in the case of Levitsky and Way's study, 
Western states and institutions. Specifically, they define linkage as “the density of 
ties... and cross-border flows...” (2010: 74). It is operationalized by scoring relative 
levels of economic flows, social contact and migration, the prevalence of Western 
training among professionals and the presence of Western civil society actors. 
Proximity is taken as a variable that affects each of these linkages, but ultimately does 
not explain the variation in trajectories directly. The effect of linkage is long-term, as 
the phenomenon less reflects specific policy goals of actors than how strongly they 
influence each other on a regular basis. 
  The distinction between the effects is of utmost importance. While leverage 
can raise the costs of repressive and authoritarian behavior in the international sphere, 
high levels of linkage actually raises domestic costs by altering popular and elite 
preferences. High linkage with the West will make it more likely that elites will defect 
if democratic norms are grossly violated because they do not wish to ruin personal, 
external relationships or legitimacy (Levitsky and Way 2010: 76).  Leverage, 
however, tends to raise the costs in the short run and in the absence of high linkage or 
low organizational strength even strong leverage can be weathered (2010). In essence, 
while leverage will determine whether or not a certain reform is passed and 
implemented, linkage will ultimately decide to what extent the content of that reform 
is consistent with larger goals of Western actors, presumably liberal democratic 
development. Their effects together, along with organizational strength of incumbents, 
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determine to what extent external forces can liberalize competition in Bosnia. 
  The final intervening factor of regime trajectories of competitive authoritarian 
regimes is the organizational capacity of it. The strength of a regime's organizational 
apparatus determines two, interrelated things. First, it clearly determines how 
effectively regime leaders can monitor elites and voters and allocate resources. 
Second, it determines whether a regime can withstand periods of strong pressure from 
Western actors and, in high-linkage cases, whether a regime's leadership will survive a 
democratic transition and continue to be a competitive actor. The organizational 
capacity can either be reflected by the strength, responsiveness and cohesion of state 
institutions, or, as in the case of Bosnia, of a party apparatus. Strong party 
organization, as mentioned previously, allows political leadership to monitor and 
control elites by patronage or intra-party surveillance (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; 
Levitsky and Way 2010; Scott 1969). It also allows resources to be allocated 
effectively (Nichter 2009). This is particularly true where, like Bosnia, elections are 
relatively competitive. 
  Consistent with the linkage assertion, Vachudova (2008) demonstrates how the 
EU can have a moderating effect on parties in EU candidate states. As the principal 
actors in elections and policy development, the effect of international actors on party 
stance is essential to understanding how countries make the transition towards 
fulfilling EU conditionality (861). Particularly pertinent for this study is the analysis 
of Central and Eastern European countries who began illiberal trajectories after 1990. 
In Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia EU conditionality only began to affect policy 
outcomes after international pressure and on illiberal incumbents and support for 
opposition parties, in the form of expertise and information, began to change the 
electoral field (Levitsky and Way 2010; Vachudova 2008). 
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  Kelley (2008) comes to, at face value, contradictory conclusions when 
examining the influence of European institutions on the adoption of ethnic policy in 
four post-communist countries. Socialization strategies, such as persuasion and 
normative pressure, have only moderate effects on policy outcomes, and then only 
when there is little domestic opposition in the countries. European Union membership 
conditionality, which relies on rational cost-benefit analyses by domestic actors, was 
much more effective. These outcomes, however, are not mutually exclusive 
(Sedelmeier 2011). Kelley also demonstrates that many of the Europe-favored policy 
outcomes were “guided” by “socialization-based efforts” that “often shaped the 
substance of the solutions” (426). A further examination of Sedelmeier's (2011) 
review of Europeanization literature reveals that the competitive authoritarianism 
model, particularly regarding regime trajectories, is consistent with the general 
conclusions drawn by experts in the past decade: that both socialization—a product of 
linkage—and conditionality—the European Union's leveraging tool—are both 
important mechanisms for international influence on domestic politics, policy 
outcomes and regime trajectories. Likewise, Vachudova (2009) with Hooghe 
demonstrates how leverage by EU constitutionality was in important and direct cause 
of political party alignment in Central and Eastern Europe leading up to EU accession.  
  Ultimately, linkage and leverage have different effects across different fields 
of policy (Sedelmeier 2011). Regarding regime trajectory, Levitsky and Way (2010) 
assert that different combinations of these factors produce predictable outcomes. 
Below I have reproduced their effects chart on the next page. 
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Linkage - Leverage3 
 
           
     High Linkage 
  
Low Linkage 
High Leverage 
 
 
Low Leverage 
    Consistent and intense  
    democratizing pressure. 
 
   Consistent but diffuse and indirect 
   democratizing pressure. 
 Often strong, but intermittent  
 and “electoralist” pressure. 
 
 Weak external pressure. 
. 
 
Table 3.1 
 
Below I illustrate how Bosnia fits into the high-linkage, low-leverage box, and that 
the results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical foundations of 
competitive authoritarianism. 
  That findings on competitive authoritarianism and Europeanization are 
consistent is important because it is the EU institutions that are primarily the ones at 
work in Bosnia. It has also provided this study with an even wider pool of expertise 
from which to draw insight. I have shown how Bosnia fits the categorization of a 
competitive authoritarian regime. It does so, however, indirectly, as its autocratic 
elites have effectively split the country into three separate electoral systems, each with 
its own dynamics. This results in a variation in electoral dominance. Together the 
agglomerated effects determine Bosnia's democratic development. The distinction 
between linkage and leverage is critical. The presence of the EU as a normative 
power, as well as a source of advisors and monitors, is playing an important role in 
the overall development of the electoral arena. As we will see, it helps to explain the 
excruciatingly slow yet steady opening of the political space to multi-ethnic parties 
and other types of opposition. 
 
                                         
3 (Levitsky and Way 2010: 84) 
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High Linkage, Low Leverage 
 It would be difficult to ascertain the differences in linkage in leverage between 
the blocs, especially with respect to linkage. The purpose of mentioning the power 
dynamics within the blocs is to demonstrate that they are, in fact, electorally separate 
and have developed accordingly. This has important consequences for Bosnia as a 
whole, as I discuss below in the final section of this analysis. Speculation on leverage 
is certainly possible though. It could easily be said that the security dilemma provides 
the leaders of the Serb and Croat blocs much more insulation from leverage except in 
periods of internal fighting, when uncertainty is high (Manning 2004). On the other 
hand, because of the Bosniak leadership's emphasis on centralization (as prescribed 
by the EU) explicit support of international actors is perhaps somewhat more critical. 
Unfortunately it would be very difficult to empirically account for the variation 
between the blocs. Were it even possible, I demonstrate below how the limitations on 
leverage posed by Bosnia's institutions would certainly continue to mitigate their 
effects. 
 The difference in linkage and leverage within Bosnia is probably less than 
between Bosnia and other competitive authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe since 
1990, however. This is because the efforts of the international community have largely 
targeted the country as whole. While this does not mean there have not been favorites, 
it does mean that the leverage and, especially, the linkage have developed somewhat 
uniformly. 
 There is little doubt that Bosnia is a case of extraordinarily high linkage with 
Western actors. After the outbreak of the civil war in 1992 Western diplomats and 
representatives negotiated with belligerent parties. The country's constitution itself is 
an annex in the US sponsored peace accord signed in Dayton, Ohio in 1995. The 
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intrusion and influence of the OHR in Bosnia's politics is very high, as well as the 
presence of Western international NGOs. This is, of course, to say nothing of the high 
levels of linkage developing in the region as the states of the former Yugoslavia 
prepare for EU accession. 
 Counter-intuitively perhaps, Western leverage is quite low. To demonstrate this 
I refer to both the factors used by Levitsky and Way to operationalize leverage as well 
as the factors outlined in the literature on Europeanization, which I demonstrated 
before to be quite compatible. Both international and domestic factors contributed to 
the effectiveness of EU conditionality on candidate states leading up to 2004 and 
2007. Scholars have pointed to monitoring capacity of international institutions as 
contributing to effective implementation of the aquis communitaire, but perhaps the 
most widely cited factor is the credibility of the reward upon which the conditions are 
placed (see: Sedelmeier 2011). Logically, if such rewards, like membership or aid, 
seem too distant or unattainable domestic actors will be equally unlikely to have the 
political will to undertake the costly reforms associated with them. Several studies 
have confirmed this hypothesis, showing that as states get closer to EU accession 
reforms and their implementation to become more comprehensive (Dimitrova and 
Pridham 2004; Vachudova 2008). 
 In Bosnia the monitoring capabilities are relatively high in terms of resources, 
yet highly decentralized, fractured and unstandardized implementation severely limits 
compliance (Noutcheva 2009). Most importantly, however, the credibility of 
achieving membership in the near to medium term is quite low. In spite of already 
cited high levels of popular support, the intransigence and stated goals of the country's 
dominant parties threaten to block efforts at critical administrative and economic 
reforms, especially those that threaten the interests of elites (Bieber 2010; Divjak and 
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Pugh 2008; Pugh 2004). Much higher levels of economic growth and development are 
also necessary. This allows elites to dismiss Europeanization as the least of Bosnia's 
problems and avoid costly reforms that might create uncertainty. Thus, while 
engagement and support are high, the reward still seems too distant to be substantial. 
 Domestically, there are several more factors that scholars of Europeanization 
have determined to be critical. As mentioned, the political costs of adopting 
conditioned reforms cannot be prohibitively high. Like all policies, reforms are likely 
to create winners and losers (as in nearly all policy fields—see: Kingdon 2011). There 
must be enough winners for elites to avoid electoral punishment in terms of either 
resources or votes. As in other post-communist countries, this is quite unlikely 
because transitions tend to be very costly in the short run, which means support for 
reforms must be sufficiently strong to weather periods of political uncertainty. 
Support for EU accession showed itself to be quite resilient leading up to 2004 in the 
Czech Republic, Poland and other post-communist counterparts (Kelley 2004; 
Sedelmeier 2011). If, however, elites are not punished for reliably implementing those 
reforms they are also unlikely to risk the potential costs of adjustment. Bosnian ethno-
nationalists have certainly acknowledged EU accession as an important goal, but they 
have hardly been punished for dragging their feet. As in other pre-accession countries, 
the political spectrum has developed around two poles: demarcation and inclusion 
(Vachudova and Hooghe 2009). Except in Bosnia inclusion refers to the state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, not the European Union. The three-bloc electoral system 
provides ethno-nationalist elites with the ability to blame elites of the other ethnicities 
for any lack of progress, thereby insulating themselves from this sort of punishment.  
 More empirically, administrative capacity, “supportive” formal institutions and 
societal mobilization in favor of reforms play an important role. As discussed, 
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administrative capacity in Bosnia is at a medium to low level. It is highly 
decentralized, poorly standardized and characterized by the duplication of functions—
both as a result of consociational arrangements and because offices are an important 
source of patronage (NDI 2010; Pugh 2004). Such duplication, lack of standardization 
and plentiful veto points enshrined in the Dayton constitution render formal 
institutions hostile to reform. Societal mobilization also faces two important obstacles. 
First, consociational political arrangements formally fragment the Bosnian electorate, 
while nationalist rhetoric reinforces the trend. This makes mobilization around one 
movement unlikely. Second, high unemployment and poor coverage of social safety 
nets marginalizes large portions of the population (World Bank 2009), effectively 
reducing mobilization to major political parties. As such, societal mobilization is quite 
low. 
 I have already established that the organizational capacity of Bosnia's 
incumbents is quite high. It clearly affects the level of leverage wielded by Western 
actors, and it is indeed difficult to discuss leverage without it. There are also some 
important, contingent characteristics unique to Bosnia that keep international leverage 
quite low. Despite the high dependence on international aid, as the first post-Cold War 
state-building project Western international actors cannot afford for Bosnia to fail 
(Caplan 2002; Bieber 2010). This has become clearer recently with the spike in 
aggressive nationalist rhetoric and separatist threats by the SNSD and HDZ (Toal and 
Maksić 2011). Just the risk of renewed conflict in Europe has tied policymakers' 
hands since 1995, and further partition means the failure of European state-building 
and the final legitimation of ethnic cleansing. These fears are further compounded by 
the fact that a failed state in the European neighborhood poses a threat to legitimacy 
and security (Juncos 2005; Osland 2004; Toal and Maksić 2011). Furthermore, that 
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HDZ, SDA and SNSD elite can perpetually place blame on their ethnic counterparts 
severely reduces the leverage of Western actors by forcing them to choose who to 
punish. Punishment of representatives of all three ethnic groups only allows for 
nationalists to the ethnic others for the suffering of everyone. As such, the 
consociational formal institutions and near ethnic homogeneity at the municipal level 
resulting from the war insulates the parties dominating their respective blocs from 
Western leverage. 
 The result then, is a case of high linkage and low leverage. Bosnia, in 
accordance with the theoretical foundations cited in this thesis, experiences constant, 
low-intensity democratizing (and moderating) pressure. The evidence is quite clear. In 
almost two decades since the end of the war, there have been no radical changes made 
to the system outlined at Dayton, but important police and military reform was 
passed, thanks in no small part to pressure from international actors (Bieber 2010). 
There also seems to be little the EU can do about incomplete or “fake” compliance to 
EU conditionality (Noutcheva 2009); the police reform, for example, has left much to 
be desired (Chandler 2005, citing Collantes Celador 2005; Chandler 2006). The same 
groups of elites have been in or close to positions of power since the war, and their 
parties continue to dominate the electoral field, whether in their original parties or 
their splinters. Nevertheless political competition, if unfair, is still a reality. Turnover 
by electoral means is possible and the main nationalist parties are, in fact, being 
pressured to compete for votes, even if that means doing so by exploiting ethnic 
theme, sources of patronage, manipulating media outlets and far outspending 
opponents. Observers often comment on the stagnation that characterizes the political 
field, but parties within the blocs proposed here do compete. Furthermore, ethnic 
conflict has not returned to the country. 
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 But the effectiveness of even high level linkage with Western actors is still 
tempered by the consociational institutions established in 1995. The constitutional 
arrangement, with features like the “vital national interest” veto, has simultaneously 
legitimized ethnic identity as a political issue and reduced possible leverage by 
providing a highly defensible policy choke point. The result is that important reforms 
cannot be forced through in the short-run without controversy over sovereignty. To 
have the desired influence the organizational strength of incumbents must be 
addressed with policies that encourage debate on economic issues and EU accession 
during campaigns, for example. The most important development in terms of electoral 
politics will have to be brought about by encouraging programmatic electoral 
competition in each of the blocs, not necessarily Bosnia as a whole. 
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V. Discussion: Can the EU make a difference? 
 
 So is there political space for the EU's foreign policy tools to effect 
constructive change in Bosnian politics? I argue that European socialization is already 
taking place, and will continue to be an important force in the country in the future. 
Although they have remained in power, for example, the dominant nationalist parties 
have responded at least rhetorically to international and popular pressure and adopted 
EU membership as long-term objective. Europe has without a doubt become part of 
the discourse, and the content of most reforms reflect the fact that EU membership 
and ethnic interests are the most influential forces (Bieber 2010; Hulsey 2010). 
 Nonetheless, formal institutions and the three electoral bloc arrangement they 
created will limit the influence of the EU to primarily socialization in the short- to 
medium-term. Even though there is constant democratizing pressure (undeniable), the 
same conditions that brought liberal forces to power in other post-communist 
countries are not present. Most notably, liberal parties cannot create a unified 
opposition, which is a key factor in cases of democratizing competitive authoritarian 
regimes (Howard 2006; McFaul 2005; Way 2005). In order to do so, liberal forces 
would have to splinter the elites from three parties, each one in its own system, 
instead of just one. Marc M. Howard (2006) points to the importance of incumbent 
turnover—that is, the resignation, death or otherwise of charismatic individuals in 
power—in “liberalizing electoral outcomes”. This is because turnover more clearly 
creates uncertainty “among the regime's rank-and-file that they have secure future”, 
while also “raising the opposition's expectations that victory is possible” (Howard 
 
41 
2006: 372). First, Bosnian elites are led by much less clearly defined personalities 
than, for example, Leonid Kuchma or Slobodan Milosevic. Second, regime cycles 
within the blocs are not likely to follow the same rhythm, making mobilization around 
opportunity structures more complicated. Even if liberal oppositions were to slowly 
begin controlling public institutions, they would still be taking over consociational, 
ethnically defined positions. This would take time to overcome because of the 
cleavages created by ethnic definition and representation because they create natural 
disincentives to cooperate, even if liberal oppositions represented the interests of more 
than one ethnic group. Thus, the obstacles to a unified position in Bosnia are much 
more formidable than in other democratizing competitive authoritarian regimes 
(Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary), who 
all experienced elite desertion of the regime in the face of a credible unified 
opposition (Hale 2005; Levitsky and Way 2010; Vachudova 2008).  
 Despite favorable conditions like high linkage, aid dependency, free elections 
and popular support for the EU, the political dynamics that have developed within 
Bosnia's institutions have severely reduced short run leverage. Sweeping changes to 
these institutions would undoubtedly make a difference, one way or the other, but 
even they would be unlikely to have the desired effect immediately. Though the state's 
decentralized, consociational institutions have in many ways shaped the behavior of 
political elites since 1995, the political dynamics themselves—i.e. loyalties, 
expectations, access to resources and the like—have themselves developed as well. It 
will be these informal institutions and expectations that will take the longest to alter. 
In the end, the EU's most effective tool is likely to be exposure, contact and 
socialization through linkage. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
 In this thesis I have explored the causes of the electoral success of Bosnia's 
dominant ethno-nationalist parties in spite of general dissatisfaction in Bosnian 
society. I have proposed that explanations that point to the appeal of these parties to 
important groups in Bosnian society are incomplete, and that a closer look at the 
electoral field is crucial. Bosnia contains not one electoral system but three. Each bloc 
is ethnically defined, dominated by single party and exhibits electoral dynamics very 
similar to other single-party dominant, competitive authoritarian states that emerged 
after the Cold War. The main characteristics of these regimes are the presence of 
liberal democratic forms, including elections, but highly distorted, unfair political 
playing fields.  
 The result is an illiberal, authoritarian regime where electoral competition is 
regular and meaningful, whose regime endurance depends on three factors: linkage 
with Western actors; organizational strength of incumbents, and; leverage of Western 
actors. Bosnia's three electoral blocs exhibit these characteristics, and their cumulated 
effect on the state render Bosnia itself a case of competitive authoritarianism that 
experiences: high linkage with Western actors; whose incumbents have a high 
organizational capacity; and low leverage of those same Western actors, paying 
special attention to the European Union. The leverage is kept low by the fact that the 
principal political actors in the country who dominate access to political resources 
benefit from the current arrangement (as they are in power), do not compete against 
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each other for votes but do for state resources, and are thereby likely to obstruct 
reforms that create uncertainty relative to their co-ethnic or cross-ethnic rivals. 
 That the EU has little leverage in Bosnia means that its ability to effect 
domestic change is considerably limited in the short- to medium-term. This includes 
its ability to pressure elites to pass important liberalizing reforms as well as to apply 
general liberalizing pressure on elites by supporting liberal parties. In short, Bosnia's 
wartime parties (and later the SNSD) have counted on asymmetric access to political 
resources since the war for its success, and the low leverage of Western actors on 
them has been unable to stop it. 
 Nevertheless, as in other competitive authoritarian regimes, real opportunities 
to challenge incumbents create the possibilities for turnover. Though the SDA, SNSD 
and the HDZ all control their respective electoral blocs quite firmly, vertical 
competition within them is both real and dynamic. 
 Future research on Bosnia's electoral dynamics would benefit then from a 
better understanding of the success of political oppositions within each of the three 
blocs proposed in this thesis, with respect to both liberal as well as smaller nationalist 
parties, such as Hulsey (2010). Controlling for resource asymmetries, to what extent 
are Bosnians voting nationalist? Under what circumstances are liberal parties more 
likely to be supported? Understanding these questions could lead to important 
developments in international engagement in ethnically divided and post-conflict 
societies, of which there will certainly be no shortage in the near future. 
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